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Smith: Smith: Continuing Plight of the Farmer:

Continuing Plight of the Farmer:
The Need for Reform in Missouri Law
Dealing with Growing Crops
Fletcherv. Stillman'
I. INTRODUCTION

"The biggest and finest crop of revolutions you ever saw is sprouting all
over this country right now.",2 John A. Simpson, president of the National
Farmers Union, made that statement to the Senate Committee on Agriculture in
1933. 3 Edward A. O'Neal, III, president of the American Farm Bureau
Federation, then added that "[u]nless something is done for the American farmer
we'll have revolution in the countryside in less than twelve months."4 Although
those statements were made over sixty years ago, they remain true today in an
economy that is rife with agricultural difficulties.5
The number of farms in the United States has declined steadily since the
1930s.6 Now, only approximately 2.06 million farms remain across the country.7
Similarly, the number of farms in Missouri has decreased by twenty-one percent
in the past forty-five years.' This decrease can be traced to problems originating
in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, when increased inflation led to an increase in
cash flow for farmers. 9 Many farmers used their increase in cash flow to
purchase additional land, but with money borrowed at long-term, high interest

1. 934 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
2. Preston D. Rideout, Jr., Ownership of Crops on ForeclosedLand,Priority of
Crop Liens and After-Acquired Property Clauses in Farm Bankruptcies, 58 MISS. L.J.

481, 481 (1988). This statement was made in January of 1933 after incidents around the
United States sparked the possibility of a revolt by farmers. Id. These incidents

included: (1) a murdered lawyer who had just foreclosed a farm in Kansas; (2)
foreclosure riots in Iowa; and (3) a group of lawyers representing insurance companies

in the East who were kidnaped and threatened with the noose until their company agreed
to a mortgage moratorium. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.

5. Id. at 481-82. See infra notes 6-12 and the accompanying text for a description
of the present agricultural economy.

6. Charles Abbott Reuters, Glickman Appoints Commission to Aide U.S. Small
Farms, COM. APPEAL, July 17, 1997, at B7.
7. Id.
8. Nanci Averett, Bucking the Trend (and Odds)Against Small Farms,CHI. TRIB.,
July 11, 1997, at A8. This statistic was provided by John Ikerd, a University of Missouri

professor of agricultural economics. Id. Ikerd also stated that "[t]he trend has been to
fewer and fewer farms all the time." Id.
9. Rideout, Jr., supranote 2, at 482.
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rates.'" The subsequent decrease in inflation, however, led to a corresponding
decrease in land value." As a result, farmers now are unable to pay off their
huge land debts strapped with the original long-term, high interest rates.'
With the current decline in the agricultural economy, many farmers lost
their land as lending institutions sold their property at foreclosure sales. The
holding in Fletcherv. Stillman and decisions in many other jurisdictions further
plague the farmer and deprive them of much needed cash by distributing their
crops to purchasers at foreclosure sales. Because of this grave situation, profarmer laws need to be enacted to revitalize the current agricultural economy.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 28, 1992, Jack R. Fletcher, Patricia A. Fletcher, James L.
Fletcher, Sr. and Maxine Fletcher (the Fletchers) purchased a farm located in
New Madrid County, Missouri at a foreclosure sale.' 3 A mature, but
unharvested, soybean crop remained on the land when the foreclosure sale
occurred.' 4 A dispute arose following the foreclosure sale when the renter
harvested the soybean crop and then placed the landlord's one-third share of the
proceeds in ajoint account.'5 The Fletchers asserted that they were entitled to
the profits from the soybean crop. ' 6 The Fletchers believed that any crops that7
had not been harvested at the time of the foreclosure sale passed with the land.'
However, Nancy Stillman (Stillman), the beneficiary of a management trust that
held title to the land until the foreclosure sale, claimed that she was entitled to
the proceeds because the soybeans had matured at the date of the foreclosure
sale."

10. Id. at 482-83.
11. Id. at 483.
12. Id.

13. Fletcher v. Stillman, 934 S.W.2d 597, 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
14. Id. An individual renting the land planted the soybean crop. Id. No further
information appears in the opinion regarding the renter. It appears that the renter had no
significance to the outcome of this decision.
15. Id. The proceeds from the harvest were put in the joint account pending
resolution of this forthcoming dispute. Id. Although a suit actually had not been filed
at the time of the harvest, it appears that the renter anticipated future litigation over the
proceeds.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. Stillman believed that this was a case of first impression because the
previous cases decided in Missouri regarding the distribution of crops had dealt with
crops that were still growing at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id. at 598. In this
instance, the crops were completely mature and ready to harvest. Id. at 597.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/13
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The Fletchers filed suit in the Circuit Court of Dunklin County claiming
entitlement to the proceeds. 9 The trial court enteredjudgment for the Fletchers
and determined that it was bound by existing case law.2" Stillman appealed this
judgment, but the Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision to grant the proceeds to the Fletchers. 21 Following prior
Missouri Supreme Court cases, the court held that purchasers at a foreclosure
sale are entitled to harvest the crops and retain the proceeds unless the crops
were severed from the land prior to the sale.' These prior cases rejected the
doctrine of constructive severance of the crops.' Therefore, the Fletchercourt
held that it was constitutionally bound to follow the previously reached
decisions, and likewise rejected the doctrine of constructive severance.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Common Law and State Statutory Approaches
to the Distributionof Crops
In most jurisdictions, the general common law rule provides that growing
crops pass with the conveyance of a fee interest in land.25 However, an

19. Id. at 597.
20. Id. In particular, the trial court stated that it was bound by the case of
Holdsworth v. Key, 520 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), superseded by stat., as
recognized in In re Temple Stephens Co., 156 B.R. 38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993). Id. In
Holdsworth, the court stated that "[i]n Missouri, it is a settled legal principle of long
standing that unless otherwise provided in the deed of trust, unsevered crops standing on
mortgaged land at the time of a foreclosure sale are subject to the lien of the deed of trust
and pass to the purchaser of the land at the foreclosure sale." Holdsworth, 520 S.W.2d
at 639.
21. Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 597.
22. Id. at 599-600. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of the Missouri cases that the court of appeals followed.
23. Id. at 598-99. The doctrine of constructive severance of crops states that once
a crop matures and is no longer dependent on the soil, then a constructive severance
occurs and it is as if the crops were already harvested and stored in a warehouse or barn.
Id. at 598. For additional discussion on the doctrine of constructive severance, see infra
note 30.
24. Id. at 598-99. Stillman argued that the court should follow the doctrine of
constructive severance and included support from several jurisdictions which adhered to
the doctrine. Id. at 599. However, no jurisdictions which encompassed Missouri were
included in her support. Id. The court specifically stated that it was "bound to follow the
controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri," and, therefore, it could not
accept the doctrine of constructive severance. Id.
25. Rideout, Jr., supra note 2, at 489. See also Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform
and More RationalApproach to Rents as Securityfor the MortgageLoan, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 349, 409-10 (1994); David A. Lander, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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exception exists that allows the vendor to reserve his rights to the crops. 26
Nonetheless, unlike the relative predictability when addressing growing crops,
courts generally remain divided on the issue of whether mature crops pass with
realty at the time of a conveyance."
Missouri courts follow the common law enunciated by most jurisdictions.
Thus, growing crops are considered realty and pass with the conveyance of the
land, unless the vendor specifically reserves a right to the harvest.2 8 The only
method available to remove the crop from the lien at a foreclosure sale is to sever
the crop from the ground prior to the sale. 9 Several Missouri courts have
recognized that landowners may sell a crop while it still is growing on the land;
however, this "constructive severance" is not effective to remove the crop from
any deed of trust or to negate the consequences of a foreclosure sale.3"
Therefore, under Missouri common law, when a foreclosure sale occurs, the
crops will pass with the realty to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale unless the
crops actually are severed from the land.'

Code and AgriculturalCollateral,409 PLI/CoMM 397, 402 (1987); Keith G. Meyer, A
PotpourriofAgricultural U.C.C. Issues: Attachment, Real Estate-GrowingCrops and
Federalization,12 HAvL1NE L. REV. 741,751 (1989). These scholars and courts reason
that growing crops should pass to the purchaser with the title to the land because growing

crops are deemed to be part of the nature of the realty. David M. Holliday, Annotation,
Conveyance ofLand as IncludingMaturebut UnharvestedCrops, 51 A.L.R. 4th 1263,

1266 (1987).
26. Rideout, Jr., supra note 2, at 489. Most states refer to this exception in their
general common law rule. See infra notes 28, 33-47 for examples of states that discuss
this exception.
27. See Holliday, supranote 25, at 1266.
28. Gerald D. Weidner, Growing Crops in Missouri: The Real Estate Law-UCC
Conflict, 52 Mo. L. REv. 647, 648 (1987). Missouri follows the general common law
approach.

29. Id. at 649. Actual severance occurs after the crop is harvested and is the only
method available to remove the crop from the lien. Id. Once the crop is severed from
the ground, it becomes personalty and does not pass with the realty at a conveyance of
the land. Id.
30. See, e.g., Farmers' Bank v. Bradley, 288 S.W. 774, 775 (Mo. 1926); Starkey
v. Powell, 288 S.W. 776, 776 (Mo. 1926), superceded by stat., as recognized in In re

Temple Stephens Co., Inc., 156 B.R. 38, 39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993); Holdsworth v.
Key, 520 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), superseded by stat., as recognized in
In re Temple Stephens Co., Inc., 156 B.R. 38, 39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993). For a more

comprehensive definition of "constructive severance," see Falk v. Amsberry, 633 P.2d
799, 802 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (constructive severance occurs when an item on
property is deemed severed from the land, although it has not actually been physically
removed from the land). For additional comments regarding the doctrine of constructive
severance, see supra note 23. Several courts have adopted the doctrine of constructive
severance. See infra notes 52-60.
31. See discussion supranote 29.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/13
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Although state courts are split throughout the United States as to whether
mature crops should pass with the realty at a foreclosure sale when an actual
severance has not occurred, 2 several states follow the law applied by Missouri
courts that unless an actual severance has occurred, the crops 3pass
to the
35
4
33
purchaser at a foreclosure sale. These states include: Delaware, Illinois, 4
9
3
8
3
7
Indiana,36 Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,' New Jersey, '
North Carolina, 42 Oklahoma, 43 Oregon, 4 South Carolina,45 Tennessee,' and
Washington.47 These states base their holdings on the idea that the degree of

32. See Holliday, supranote 25, at 1266.
33. Fletcher v. Stillman, 934 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that
crops pass with title to the land, whether mature or immature).
34. Womach v. Thomas, 486 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding that mature
crops are not excepted from the general rule that title to crops pass with the land, unless
specifically reserved by the seller).
35. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank v. McCambridge, 175 N.E. 834, 836 (Ill. 1931)
(finding that the grantee becomes vested with complete title to the land and all crops
growing or grown, mature or unmature on the land).
36. In re Estate of Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 263, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (reasoning
that growing crops follow title to realty without agreement to the contrary).
37. Kroh v. Dobson, 37 N.W.2d 144, 145-46 (Mich. 1949) (determining that crops,
whether mature or immature, pass with the realty, absent contrary intent in the contract).
38. Christenson v. Town ofDollymount, 63 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Minn. 1954) (stating
that owner who possesses land acquires title to all crops growing on the land at that

time).
39. Ellis v. Sutton, 88 So. 519, 521 (Miss. 1921) (noting that purchaser acquires
crops at conveyance, even though the crops are mature).
40. Kobza v. Spath, 90 N.W.2d 246, 252-53 (Neb. 1958) (holding that unless
reserved, crops standing on the ground, whether mature or not, pass to the purchaser at
a sale).
41. Eckman v. Beihl, 184 A. 430, 434 (N.J. 1936) (holding that conveyance of real
estate carries with it the crops, unless there is an express reservation in the deed).
42. Swindell v. Overton, 302 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), rev'don other
grounds, 314 S.E.2d 512 (N.C. 1984) (determining that purchaser at foreclosure sale is
entitled to unsevered crops).
43. Dixon v. Pugh, 178 P. 880, 882 (Okla. 1919) (finding that purchasers of land
at a foreclosure sale are entitled to all crops on the land, whether mature or immature).
44. Falk v. Amsberry, 633 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (determining that
conveyance of land will convey the crops to the purchaser, unless reserved by the
vendor).
45. Smith v. Bankhead, 106 S.E. 469 (S.C. 1921) (noting that crops still attached
to the land pass with the conveyance of the land).
46. Langford v. Hudson, 241 S.W. 393, 394-95 (Tenn. 1922) (holding that crops
pass with the land at a conveyance).
47. Rudy-Patrick Co. v. Dela Costa Farming Co., 557 P.2d 869, 872 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976) (concluding that crops pass with the realty, whether unripe or mature, absent
reservation in the deed).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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maturity of crops should not be the controlling factor used to determine the
owner of crops after a foreclosure sale.4" These courts hold this view because
49
of the inherent uncertainty in determining when a crop completely matures. In
addition, these courts generally see the theory of constructive severance as "little
more than a fictitious rationale" allowing articles on land to be considered
personal property in order to depict parties' intentions.5" Instead, these states
ignore the state of maturity of crops and hold that crops, until severed from the
land, pass with the realty to the purchasers at the foreclosure sale.5
Several states take the contrary position that mature crops are
"constructively severed," thus the crops should not pass with the title to the land
56
at conveyance. 52 These states include: Colorado, 53 Hawaii, 54 Iowa,55 Kansas,
Louisiana,5 South Dakota, 58 Texas, 59 and Wyoming.60 They adhere to the idea

48. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
49. See Holliday, supra note 25, at 1266. The courts which follow this reasoning
state that it would be difficult for courts to determine the numerous controversies which
would arise if the title to crops was determined by the state of maturity. See Holliday,
supra note 25, at 1266.
50. Falk, 633 P.2d at 802 n.1.
51. See supranotes 34-47. Essentially all of these state courts reject the doctrine
of constructive severance in its entirety. Several states, including Missouri, accept the
idea that a crop may be sold or encumbered while it is still growing; however, this
"constructive severance" does not effectively remove the crop from any prior lien on the
land. Holdsworth v. Key, 520 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
52. For a description of the courts that do follow the doctrine of constructive
severance, see infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
53. Wood v. Wood, 183 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1947) (determining that the rule that
growing crops pass with the conveyance of land only applies to crops that still draw
nutrients from the soil and does not apply to crops that are ripe and ready for harvest).
54. United States v. 729.773 Acres of Land, 531 F. Supp. 967 (D. Haw. 1982)
(holding that cultivated cane sugar still growing on property is considered personal
property and not part of the real property).
55. Goldstein v. Mundon, 210 N.W. 444 (Iowa 1926) (reasoning that crops are
fully mature and do not pass to the purchaser when they no longer receive sustenance
from the soil).
56. Jones v. Anderson, 233 P.2d 483 (Kan. 1951) (holding that the rule that crops
pass with conveyance of land does not apply to crops which are ripe or ready to harvest).
57. Porche v. Bodin, 28 La. Ann. 761 (La. 1876) (deciding that purchasers are not
entitled to crops, whether in the field or in the house).
58. Kettering v. Barber, 159 N.W. 133 (S.D. 1916) (holding that fully mature and
unharvested crops do not pass to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale).
59. Gulf Stream Realty Co. v. Monte Alto Citrus Ass'n, 253 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1952) (determining that annually cultivated crops, whether growing or standing in
the field ready to be harvested, are not part of the realty).
60. Haldeman v. Wyoming Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469 (10th Cir. 1994)
(interpreting Wyoming law to state that title to crops pass with real property to the extent
that the crops had not yet matured at the time of the foreclosure sale).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/13
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that unharvested crops that are ripe and fully mature stop receiving any
sustenance from the soil; consequently, they possess the characteristics of
personalty and should not pass with the title to the land at conveyance.6' In other
words, when the crop no longer draws nutrients from the soil, a constructive
severance occurs and the crop no longer bears the same relationship to the land
as it once did.62 Instead, it is as if the fanner already stored the crops in a
warehouse or barn. 63 Parties asserting the theory of constructive severance often
claim that this is "the more equitable and fair rule."'' Even courts rejecting the
doctrine have admitted that the alternative rule (granting purchasers the crops)
"may seem harsh" and can "result in significant losses to farm debtors."65
In addition to the two approaches just discussed and followed by the
majority of the states, alternative methods of determining the title to crops are
employed by three states. In Florida, the nature of the crops determines whether
the crops pass to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale.66 Mature crops grown by
yearly cultivation are considered 'fructus industriales"and do not pass with a
conveyance of the realty.' In the alternative, trees, fruits and grasses that grow
spontaneously and without cultivation are considered "fructusnaturales"and,
thus, pass to the purchasers.68
69
A Georgia statute simply defines mature crops as personalty.
Consequently, courts in Georgia hold that mature crops do not pass to the

61. See Holliday, supra note 25, at 1272.

62. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 183 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1947); First Nat'l Bank v.
Beegle, 35 P. 814 (Kan. 1894).
63. Holliday, supra note 25, at 1272. In addition, the defendant in Fletcher
referred to this analysis when she made her argument in favor of accepting the doctrine
of constructive severance in Missouri. Fletcher v. Stillman, 934 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996).
64. See Fletcher, 934 S.W.2d at 598. Stillman alleged that the doctrine of
constructive severance was "the more equitable and fair rule." Id.
65. Swindell v. Overton, 302 S.E.2d 841, 847 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
66. Stoltzfus v. Covington County Bank, 154 So. 2d 866, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963). See also Adams v. Adams, 28 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1946); Summerlin v. Orange
Shores, Inc., 122 So. 508 (Fla. 1929).
67. Stoltzfus, 154 So. 2d at 868. Fructusindustrialesinclude annual products of
the earth, such as crops of grain and vegetables. Id. at 867. These products are the result
of yearly labor and cultivation and are considered chattels; therefore, they do not pass
with the realty at conveyance. Id.
68. Id. Until severed from the land,fructus naturalesare not considered chattels
and pass with the conveyance of land. Id.
69. GA. CODEANN. § 44-14-101 (1997) provides:
(a) ... the term "crops" means the fruits and products of all annual and
perennial plants, trees, and shrubs and the crude gum, oleoresin, from a living
tree.
(b) All mature or unmature crops are declared to be personalty.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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purchaser at a conveyance. 70 This statute effectively renders all mature crops
personalty; therefore, at a conveyance, whether voluntary or involuntary, the
crops do not pass with the title to the land.7'
In Mississippi, the legislature has enacted statutes concerning the
distribution of crops. These statutes grant additional rights to the mortgagor and
preclude the passage of title of crops at conveyance to the purchaser.72 One of
these statutes allows the mortgagor the right to all crops growing on the property
at the commencement of foreclosure proceedings. 3 In addition, the statute
grants the fanner (mortgagor) the right to complete cultivation of the crops and
permits the farmer to reenter the land to remove the crops, so long as the fanner
first pays the purchaser a reasonable compensation for use of his former land.74
Mississippi courts have allowed defaulting mortgagors, 75 tenants, 76 and evicted
individuals77 to reenter the premises in order to collect their growing crops.

70. See, e.g., Miller v. Jackson, 10 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ga. 1940) (holding that crops of
pecan nuts are considered personalty under the statute and do not pass to the purchaser
by conveyance of the land); Chatham Chem. Co. v. Vidalia Chem. Co., 136 S.E. 62, 63
(Ga. 1926) (determining that all crops in this state are personalty and do not pass to the
purchasers at a judicial sale).
71. GA. CODEANN. § 44-14-101 (1997). See supra note 69 for the full text of the
statute.
72. MISS. CODEANN.

§

11-25-25 (1972) provides:

[I]n case of foreclosure of deeds in trust or mortgages, the mortgagor shall be
entitled to cultivate and gather the crops, if any, planted by him and grown or
growing on the premises at the time of the commencement of the suit; and
shall, after eviction therefrom have the right to enter thereon for the purpose
of completing the cultivation and removing the crops, first paying or
tendering to the party entitled to the possession a reasonable compensation for
the use of the land.
In addition, MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-25-115 (Supp. 1997) states that growing crops are
considered personal property.
73. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-25-25 (1972). See supra note 72 for the full text of the
statute.
74. MISS. CODEANN. § 11-25-25 (1972).
75. Wood v. Pace, 143 So. 471, 473 (Miss. 1932) (deciding that defaulting
mortgagor could collect his crop when he cultivated and maintained it).
76. Garner v. Stuart Co., 75 So. 2d 747, 749 (Miss. 1954) (holding that the tenant
had the right to enter the land after the expiration of the lease to collect the crops which
he had planted).
77. Id. at 748-49 (stating that although the tenant was evicted from the property,
he still had a reasonable time to enter the land and harvest his growing corn crop).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/13
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B. The Uniform Commercial Code Approach
to Distributionof Crops
In 1962, Missouri adopted a version of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).78 The creators of the UCC debated whether to consider farmers as
consumers or merchants.79 As a compromise, they created special rules to
attempt to protect the farmer.80
As discussed earlier, real property law in most states provides that a
purchaser at a foreclosure sale takes title to growing crops incident to the transfer
of the purchased land."' The crops pass with the land at a conveyance because
they are considered part of the real property.82 However, the analysis arguably
is different under the UCC. The UCC defines "goods" to include growing crops
in both the Article 2 sales provisions83 and the Article 9 secured transactions
provisions.84 Due to these provisions, Article 9 commentators have supported
the theory that growing and mature crops should be considered personal property
and should be governed by the UCC.8 s This idea conflicts with the majority of
state common law decisions holding that crops should be considered as part of
the realty. Consequently, there is a conflict between the common law and the
UCC.
In United States v. Newcomb,86 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
squarely addressed this conflict. This case involved a dispute between the
government and a contract vendor who previously had sold a piece of real estate
78. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.1-101 (1994).
79. Lander, supranote 25, at 399.
80. Lander, supra note 25, at 399. The original draftsmen actually created six
special sets of rules pertaining to farmers; however, the 1972 amendment to the UCC
eliminated three of the rules. Lander, supranote 25, at 399. The three remaining rules
state that: (1)local filing is required to perfect a secured interest in all farm collateral
under the second and third alternative versions of Section 9-401 (1); (2) Section 9-312(2)
provides priority treatment for purchase money security interests in crops; and (3)
Section 9-307 states that a bonafide purchaser of farm products does not take free and
clear of all liens created by the seller. Lander, supranote 25, at 399-400.
81. Lander, supranote 25, at 402. See also supranotes 33-47 and accompanying
text.
82. Lander, supranote 25, at 402.
83. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-105 (1994).
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-105 (1994).
85. Lander, supranote 25, at 402. This reasoning may be explained by examining
the purpose and scope of Article 9, which provides that it "applies so far as concerns any
personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state (a) to any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property
or fixtures including goods." Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-102 (1994). Because crops are
considered goods under the UCC, it appears that the drafters intended the UCC to pertain
to security interests in crops.
86. 682 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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under a contract for deed. In particular, the court was to determine who was
entitled to the proceeds from crops planted by the purchaser of the real estate
who had granted a security interest in the crops to the Federal Housing
Association (government) and later failed to make mortgage payments to the
contract vendor."8 The contract vendor argued that Missouri common law should
govern the issue. Thus, following real estate law, title to the crops would not
pass to the government because title to the land did not pass to the government
when the purchasers defaulted on the payments.8 9 The district court, however,
held that Article 9 of the UCC, as adopted by Missouri, applied.' Therefore, the
government's perfected security interest in the crop and the proceeds from the
sale of the crop, superseded the contract vendor's interest which was not a
security interest.9' The court determined that because the contract vendor did not
adhere to the Article 9 requirements to create a valid security interest, the
government had the only valid security interest in the crop and was entitled to
the crop and the proceeds.'
On appeal, Newcomb argued that the district court erroneously viewed the
case as one involving conflicting Article 9 security interests. 93 The court of
appeals rejected this argument and held that Article 9 did apply to the situation. 9'
Applying Article 9, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision and
granted the crops to the only perfected security interest holder, the government. 95
In reaching this decision, the court essentially held that all growing crops, by
definition, are personal property and not real estate; therefore, Article 9 applies
to growing crops.

87. Id. at 759. Newcomb sold farmland to the Rush family ("purchasers") under
a contract for deed that was never recorded. Id. The purchasers planted a crop on the
land and executed a security interest with Farmers Home Association ("FHA"). Id. On
both the security agreement and financing statement, the FHA claimed a security interest
in all crops then growing or later grown on the land and all proceeds from the sale of
such crops. Id. The purchasers defaulted on their contract for deed and after a
foreclosure suit, they were ejected from the property. Id. at 760. Newcomb proceeded
to harvest the crops and sell them; however, the government (acting for the FHA) filed
this action to recover the proceeds generated from the sale of the crop. Id.
88. For a detailed discussion on the facts, see supranote 87.
89. Newcomb, 682 F.2d at 760.
90. Id.

91. Id.
92. Id. at 761.
93. Id. at 760.
94. Id. at 761. By applying Article 9, the court seems to be stating that crops are
always considered personal property; therefore, without an Article 9 security interest, an
individual has no claim to the crops. This implicitly rejects the notion that crops could
be part of the realty,'completely contradicting Missouri real estate law.
95. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss2/13
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There are several requirements that must be met in order to establish an
enforceable security interest under Article 9.96 Once a valid security interest has
been established, it becomes enforceable against the debtor.9 7 However, there
exists no similar provision within the UCC that provides guidelines for a court
to determine priority between the secured interest holder and a third party.9 The
court in Newcomb relied on various provisions within the UCC to determine that
the security interest superceded the third-party interest;99 but there is no specific
provision that the court could rely on to reach its decision.

96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-203 (1994) provides that:
(1)... a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties
with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to
agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains
a description of the collateral and in addition, when the security interest
covers crops growing or to be grown. .

. ,

a description of the land

concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes enforceable against the
debtor with respect to the collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the
events specified in subsection (1) have taken place unless explicit agreement
postpones the timing of attaching.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement gives the secured party the
rights to proceeds provided by section 400.9-306.
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-203(2) (1994).
98. Although there is not a specific provision within the UCC which addresses this
issue, there is a catch-all priority provision included in Section 400.9-201. This
provision provides that "except as otherwise provided by this chapter a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors." Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-201 (1994). The Uniform
Commercial Code's Official Comment explains that the security agreement is effective
against third parties; however, an exception to this general rule arises when a specific
provision defeats the catch-all provision. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-201 (1994)
(comment). Because of this exception, it could be argued that Section 400.9-104, which
excludes transfers of real estate from this article, precludes analysis of this issue under
the catch-all priority provision.
99. Newcomb, 682 F.2d at 760-62. For instance, the court examined the purpose
and scope section of Article 9 in order to determine that the UCC applied in this type of
transaction. Id. at 760. The court also noted that ordinarily under Article 9 interests or
liens in real estate are excluded; however, the court states that because crops are defined
as personal property, and not real estate, they are not subject to the exclusion. Id. at 761.
Lastly, the court mentioned that Section 400.9-204(4) specifically permits the acquisition
of a separate security interest in future crops in connection with a land conveyance. Id.
at 762.
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Technically, the Newcomb decision does not directly overrule prior
Missouri decisions granting the crops to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale.'
No Missouri case has considered a situation involving an Article 9 security
interest in crops; however, pre-UCC cases concerning similar issues were
decided to the contrary."" In addition, a post-UCC case involving an outright
sale of the growing crops held that the prior mortgage had priority.'0 2
While Newcomb is a federal decision and is not in direct conflict with any
prior Missouri decisions, it still is likely that a change in Missouri law regarding
the disposition of crops will occur. The decision in Newcomb does indirectly
contradict Missouri real estate cases rejecting the doctrine of constructive
severance. 3 Newcomb involved a situation in which a prior mortgage (contract
for deed) existed and the mortgagor encumbered the crop with another lien (the
government's security interest). Similarly, the mortgagor could have contracted
to sell the growing crops instead of executing a security interest.'O Because
crops are considered goods under the sales provisions of the UCC0 5 and Article
2 allows a present sale of growing crops,' 6 the holding in Newcomb would apply
in this type of transaction and the sale of the growing crop would effectively
remove the crop from the lien of the prior mortgage. 7 Allowing this sale or
execution of a security interest to remove the growing crops from a prior
mortgage is tantamount to the adoption of the doctrine of constructive
severance.' 8 Missouri courts consistently have rejected the doctrine of
constructive severance; therefore, the holding in Newcomb seems to conflict
indirectly with prior Missouri decisions and creates a question as to where
Missouri actually stands on the issue of constructive severance. When a
Missouri court finally is faced with a case involving this type of transaction, it
will have to determine whether it should follow Newcomb or prior Missouri real
estate law.

100. Weidner, supranote 28, at 654.
101. Weidner, supra note 28, at 654. See, e.g., Farmers' Bank v. Bradley, 288
S.W. 774 (Mo. 1926).
102. Weidner, supranote 28, at 654 (discussing Holdsworth v. Key, 520 S.W.2d

637 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)). Holdsworth has been criticized by subsequent courts. See In
re Temple Stephens Co., Inc., 156 B.R. 38, 39 (W.D. Mo. 1993). This court questioned
why the UCC was not used to determine the outcome of the case. Id. The court stated
that because the attorneys and the court did not think to mention the UCC, the
Holdsworth opinion only stood for the proposition that prior to the UCC, a security
interest in crops went with the deed of trust. Id.
103. Weidner, supra note 28, at 654.
104. Weidner, supra note 28, at 654.
105. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.2-105 (1997).
106. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.2-107 (1997).

107. Weidner, supra note 28, at 654.
108. Weidner, supra note 28, at 654.
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Other recent decisions confront the conflict between common law and the
UCC regarding the distribution of crops. In Anna NationalBankv. Prater,'"9 the
court was asked to determine whether a real estate mortgagee's interest in crops
under a "rents and profits" clause contained in the mortgage was sufficient to
constitute a security interest subject to Article 9 of the UCC." 0 The court
determined that the "rents and profits" clause did create a lien upon the crops;
however, the right derived from the real estate mortgage."' Article 9 of the UCC
is expressly limited to secured transactions involving personal property and does
not apply to real estate transactions."12 Thus, no security interest existed that
could be governed by the UCC."' The court then looked to Illinois common law
to reach its decision."' Because unsevered crops growing on mortgaged lands
are considered part of the realty under Illinois common law, the court determined
that the mortgagee was entitled to the crops when he took possession of the
land." 5 This decision seems to establish a method for avoiding determination
under the UCC.1' 6 By providing a "rents and profits" clause within the real
estate mortgage, the matter7is excluded from the UCC and state common law is
used to reach a decision."
In Rubin v. Kampen,"8 the court was faced with the issue of priority
interests between a bankruptcy trustee and a holder of a deed of trust. 9 The
bank had a mortgage on land owned by the debtor and an unperfected security
interest in crops growing on the mortgaged land. 2 ' The debtor filed a
bankruptcy petition before the crops were harvested and the bank then claimed
that its security interest gave it priority over the crops.' 2 ' The court held that the
109. 506 N.E.2d 769 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
110. Id. at 775. The court noted that this issue was one of first impression in
Illinois. Id.
11. Id. at 776.
112. Id.

113. Id. The UCC did not apply in this situation because Section 9-104(j) of the
Illinois Revised Statutes specifically excludes from application of Article 9 "the creation
or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder.
.." Id. at 775. The court determined that the real estate mortgagee's right to the crops
was incident to the real estate involved; therefore, the UCC exclusion provision applied.
Id.
at 776.
114. Anna Nat ' Bank, 506 N.E.2d at 776.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.The "rents and profits" clause creates a lien upon the crops to protect the
mortgagee upon default. Id.Because the mortgagee's right to the rents and profits are
incident to the foreclosure of the real estate involved, the rents and profits clause does not
create asecurity interest subject to Article 9.Id.
118. 48 B.R.389 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1984).

119. Id.
at 391.
120. Id.
121. Id.
at 392.
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bank's security interest was unperfected because of an insufficient description
of the land on which the crops were growing." Because the security agreement
was not perfected, the bankruptcy trustee's lien had priority. " In addition, the
bank claimed that under Missouri common law, crops pass with the realty.
Therefore, the bank argued that its mortgage on the underlying land gave the
bank a lien on the crops. 24 The court held that Missouri real estate law granting
growing and unsevered crops to the deed of the trust holder at the time of a
foreclosure sale had no application when the bankruptcy trustee's lien intervenes
before the foreclosure sale is held."z The court stated that the bankruptcy
trustee's hypothetical lien attached to the crops when the bankruptcy petition
was filed. 6 Consequently, it is as if the crops actually were severed prior to the
foreclosure hearing. 27 This decision allows ajudgment lien properly attached
to growing crops to effectively remove the crops from a prior mortgage lien.'28
In reaching this decision, a Missouri court again chose to use the UCC for
analysis rather than the Missouri common law.
One final consideration is an approach that was taken in In re Hoover.'29
An Ohio bankruptcy court followed the decision reached in Newcomb and
determined that a secured party with an interest in a crop retained his interest
even after the real estate on which the crop was growing reverted to an
individual other than the debtor. 30 However, the court chose to extend the
Newcomb decision and apply the theory of unjust enrichment.' 3 ' The Ohio
Revised Code adopted portions of the UCC stating that the principles of law and
equity shall supplement its provisions. 32 Therefore, the court determined that
unjust enrichment had occurred because the secured creditors "enjoyed the
33
benefit of using the applicant's land to increase the value of their collateral."'

122. Id. at 393.
123. Kampen, 48 B.R. at 393.
124. Id. at 392.
125. Id. at 393.
126. Id. at 393 n.5.
127. Id.
128. Weidner, supranote 28, at 657.
129. 31 B.R. 432 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
130. Id. at 437. Although no Ohio case discussed this issue, the court found the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Newcomb persuasive, and adopted its holding. Id.
131. Id. at 438. The court defined unjust enrichment as a situation which involves
an individual who "retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to
another." Id. (citing Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923, 923 (Ohio 1938)).
132. Ornlo REv. CODE ANN. § 1301.03 (West 1997) states that "the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, or other invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."
133. Hoover, 31 B.R. at 438.
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The court held that the landowner was entitled to reasonable compensation for
the use of his land.'34
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Fletcherv. Stillman,'35 the court initially considered whether the facts at
issue presented a case of first impression. 3 6 The court described the two
distinctive theories governing the distribution of crops: the necessity of actual
severance and the theory of constructive severance.'37 The court stated that
jurisdictions that adhere to the theory of constructive severance reason that once
a crop is mature, it is no longer gaining sustenance from the soil; therefore, it
does not bear the same relationship to the land as if it were still growing.'
The court examined three cases to determine whether it was dealing with
a case of first impression with respect to the appropriate rule governing the
distribution of crops.'39 First, the court analyzed Vogt v. Cunningham "4and
determined that the Vogt court exhaustively examined other theories used to
determine the distribution of crops and held that the matter rested on the
relationship of the crops to the land, and not the state of maturity.' 4' The court
stated that contrary to the defendant's belief, the Vogt decision was directly on
point. Hence, the case was not one of first impression.'42

134. Id. The court determined that the land owner was entitled to $4,666.69 for
compensation for the use of his land. Id. The remaining funds would be used to satisfy
the secured claim. Id.
135. 934 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
136. Id. at 598. The defendant asserted that this was a case of first impression
because it involved mature crops, whereas the cases the circuit court relied on all
involved crops that were still growing at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Because the crop is no longer dependent on the soil, it is as if it were
already stored in a barn or warehouse. Id.
139. Id.
140. Vogt v. Cunningham, 50 Mo. App. 136 (1892).
141. Fletcher, 934 S.W.-2d at 598. The court mentioned the dictum in Vogt v.
Cunningham, 50 Mo. App. 136, 140 (1892), which stated that "[t]he right of the former
owner or his tenant, as against the purchaser under the foreclosure sale, is made to
depend on the fact as to whether or not the crops have been separated from the soil, and
not upon any state of maturity." Fletcher, 934 S.W.2d at 598.
142. Fletcher,934 S.W. 2d at 599. The court referred to a quote used in Vogt v.
Cunningham, 50 Mo. App. at 140-41, which stated that "[i]f... the crops are to be
considered as land or personal chattels, as they continue or do not continue to draw
nourishment from the soil, the instances will be numerous in which very difficult
inquiries will be requisite to settle the point." Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 599.
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43
The Fletchercourt then examined Farmers'Bank ofHickory v. Bradley1
and Starkey v. Powell,'" which were handed down concurrently, and concluded
that the Supreme Court of Missouri had clearly rejected the doctrine of
constructive severance. 45 The court referred to a statement made in Bradley
specifically stating that an actual severance must occur before a crop will be free
from the lien of the deed of trust." The Fletchercourt also explained that when
Starkey was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the Starkey court held
that the Bradley decision controlled the case at bar. Therefore, the doctrine of
constructive severance was rejected. 47 After analyzing these two decisions,
along with the Vogt decision, the Fletchercourt determined that Missouri
courts
148
consistently had rejected the doctrine of constructive severance.
The court then explained that the Missouri Constitution 149 bound courts to
follow the controlling determinations reached by the Supreme Court of
Missouri.' Thus, the court determined that it was constitutionally required to
follow the holdings in Bradley and Starkey, which clearly rejected the doctrine
of constructive severance.' 5'
Finally, the court acknowledged the defendant's assertion that Bradley and
Starkey were distinguishable because they involved circumstances in which the
crops were not mature at the time of the foreclosure sale." 2 Nevertheless, it
determined that this distinction did not make a difference. 53 The court stated
that Bradley and Starkey were not determined on the narrow question of crop
maturity; instead, they were decided on the broader basis that Missouri would
not accept the doctrine of constructive severance. 54
Basing its decision on the prior Missouri cases cited above and the notion
that courts are constitutionally bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, the court rejected the doctrine of constructive severance. 55 In
rejecting the doctrine of constructive severance, the court concluded that a crop

143. 288 S.W. 774 (Mo. 1926).
144. 288 S.W. 776 (Mo. 1926).
145. Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 599.
146. Id. The court quoted the dictum in Bradley, which explained, "'We have
uniformly held that neither the owner of the land nor his grantee could free the growing
crop of the lien of the deed of trust, except by and actual severance from the soil before
possession taken or foreclosure had under the deed of trust."' Id. (citing Bradley, 288
S.W. at 775).
147. Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 599.
148. Id. at 598.
149. Mo. CoNST. art. V, § 2.
150. Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 599.
151. Id. at 599-600.
152. Id. at 600.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 599.
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may only be freed from the lien of a deed of trust by actual severance from the
land. 5 6
V. COMMENT
The decision reached in Fletcherv. Stillman certainly comports with prior
Missouri case law. However, the rejection of the doctrine of constructive
severance and the holding that there must be an actual severance of the crops in
order for the debtor to retain possession of them after a foreclosure sale appears
to ignore serious policy concerns, including fundamental notions of fairness.
Although the Fletcher court followed the majority of common law
jurisdictions,'57 other state courts have reached far more equitable decisions.
With the troubles that continue to plague Missouri farmers, it appears that a more
pro-farmer common law theory could help to revitalize the agricultural
economy.'58 Although the Fletcher court mentioned the consequences of
adopting the doctrine of constructive severance in its entirety, 59 it failed to
consider the policy implications of rejecting the doctrine, as well as possible
alternatives to avoid the hard-line rule that the courts continue to apply.
For instance, notions of equity would encourage allowing the farmer to
maintain his crops after a foreclosure sale of his land. Theoretically, the
purchaser at a foreclosure sale will pay more for the land because he realizes the
worth of the unharvested crops. However, realistically it is unlikely that the
farmer will receive fair market value for the worth of his crops at a forced sale.
Consequently, if current Missouri common law is followed, the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale is unjustly enriched. By purchasing at the foreclosure sale, the
purchaser receives a windfall: he not only receives the farmland at a reduced
price but also receives products from another individual's labor. In order to
erase this inequity, farmers need the opportunity to be able to harvest their crops.
Lenders may attempt to argue that a change in law would not produce more
fairness. Because land often is not sold for the entire debt amount, lenders may
feel that the additional crop rights help increase purchase price at foreclosure
sales. While this may be true, it is unlikely that lenders of farmland look to one

156. Id. at 600.
157. See generallyPart II.A. for a discussion of the various jurisdictions and their
approaches to the distribution of crops after a foreclosure sale.
158. Rideout, Jr., supra note 2, at 482-83. Farmers who obligated themselves to
long term mortgages at high interest rates are now unable to pay off their huge land
debts. Rideout, Jr., supra note 2, at 482-83. Pro-farmer laws in this area could allow
farmers to collect their crops and at least salvage their year's work.
159. Fletcher,934 S.W.2d at 599. The court notes that if the state of maturity
determines the distribution of the crops, there will be numerous situations that will pose
serious difficulties in establishing the level of maturity. Id. While the court is bound by
existing case law, other policy implications and possible legislative amendments could

have been discussed.
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year's crop production to determine whether to approve a loan. Lenders would
not rely on an annual crop production that might not occur due to unavoidable
circumstances, such as drought, flooding or fire. In addition, if a lender feels
strongly about having control over the planted crops in case of foreclosure, the
lender has the right to take out a separate lien on the crops. This lien would
ensure worried lenders that they have priority rights in both the farmland and the
cultivation. In cases in which lenders are secure with only the farmland lien, the
destitute farmer at least would be entitled to retain the crops that he planted.
By rejecting the doctrine of constructive severance, the Fletcher court
essentially obliterates the farmer's chance of recovering any of the crops that he
planted, sewed and planned to harvest.160 Due to the high interest mortgages
assumed by farmers in the mid-1970s and early 1980s when inflation created
increased cash flows, 16 1 farmers now are unable to pay off their debts. 162 In
essence, the farmer's livelihood is eliminated, creating the possibility that
agricultural land will not be used for its best purpose.
A more fair and equitable solution would be to adopt a pro-farmer statute
similar to that implemented in Mississippi.' 63 That statute permits the mortgagor
(farmer) to reenter his former land in order to cultivate and harvest his crops that
were growing at the time of the foreclosure sale.'" In exchange for the privilege
of harvesting the crops, the former landowner first must pay the party entitled to
possession a reasonable compensation for the use of the land. 65 Because of the
remedial nature of this portion of the statute, courts have liberally construed the
provision." If a situation arises where the farmer has not paid the purchaser for
the use of the land, then the court may, on demand of the purchaser, order the
amount to be paid. 67 While this statute provides a pro-farmer resolution to the
distribution of crops issue, it maintains some measure of equity by providing
compensation to the purchaser for the use of the land.

160. It could be argued that lenders should not be entitled to the crops because they
merely plan to immediately turn around and re-sell the land. In addition, from an
economical and social standpoint, their possible loss due to lower interest rates does not
compare to the loss of livelihood for farmers.
161. Rideout, Jr., supranote 2, at 482.
162. Rideout, Jr., supranote 2, at 483.
163. For the complete language provided in MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-25-25 (1997),

see supranote 72. For a more in depth discussion on the statute and its effect, see supra
notes 72-77.
164. MISS. CODEANN. § 11-25-25 (1972).
165. Miss. CODEANN. § 11-25-25 (1972).
166. See, e.g., Joiner v. Leflore Grocer Co., 110 So. 857, 860 (Miss. 1926)
(holding that purchaser at foreclosure sale was only entitled to reasonable rent for use
after the foreclosure sale because of the remedial purpose of the statute); Wood v. Pace,
143 So. 471, 473 (Miss. 1932) (acknowledging remedial purpose of statute and
construing it liberally to give former tenant possession of pecans still growing on trees).
167. MiSS. CODEANN. § 11-25-25 (1997).
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Although Missouri currently does not have a statute protecting debtor
farmers, the legislature has enacted a statute that protects tenants' rights to
growing and unharvested crops."' This statute provides that all mortgages of
real property or security agreements providing a security interest in personal
property are valid and binding upon mortgagors and debtors. 69 However, the
statute also includes an exception that states that this provision will not affect the
rights of a tenant to the growing crops on foreclosed land. 7 Because the
legislature acknowledged a need for an exception for tenants with regard to
growing crops, it seems likely that it would be receptive to a statute that
protected farmer-debtors as well.
Although the Fletchercourt was not confronted with a UCC analysis, it is
likely that future Missouri courts will have to decide the issue of the applicability
of the UCC to determine the distribution of crops. While the Eighth Circuit
already has determined its position regarding this issue, 7' a Missouri state court
has not yet been asked to determine specifically Missouri's approach to the
problem. While many commentators and judges have determined that the Eighth
Circuit approach is clearly the correct answer,"' there are legitimate arguments
in favor of applying the common law instead of the UCC' 73
In Newcomb, " the court held that Article 9 applied and that growing crops
are personal property, not part of the real estate.'75 The court supported its
position by referring to various provisions within the UCC. However, there was

168. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.290 (1994) provides that:

All mortgages of real property or security agreements providing a security
interest in personal property, or both, with powers of sale in the mortgagee or
secured party, and all sales made by such mortgagee, secured party or his
personal representatives, in pursuance of the provisions of the mortgages or
security agreements, shall be valid and binding by the laws of this state upon
the mortgagors and debtors, and all persons claiming under them, and shall
forever foreclose all right and equity of redemption of the property so sold.
Nothing herein shall be construed to affect in any way the rights of a tenant
to the growing and unharvested crops on lands foreclosed as aforesaid, to the
extent of the interest of the tenant under the terms of contract or lease between
the tenant and the mortgagor or his personal representatives.
169. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.290 (1994).

170. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.290 (1994).
171. See United States v. Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758 (8th. Cir. 1982).
172. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 25, at 762 (discussing why the author believes
Newcomb provides the best answer to the dilemma); In re Hoover, 31 B.R. 432 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983) (following the Newcomb reasoning but extending the decision to apply
unjust enrichment).
173. See supranotes 164-71 and accompanying text for a description of several
arguments the farmer could raise.
174. Newcomb, 682 F.2d at 758.
175. Id. at 761.
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no clear-cut answer provided within the UCC. 7 6 While the UCC specifically

refers to the priority interest between the debtor and the secured interest
holder,'" there is no equivalent provision providing information regarding who
has a priority interest between the secured interest holder and a third party. 78
Due to the absence of a specific provision within the UCC determining a
priority dispute between the secured interest holder and a third party, a third
party has a valid argument that the provisions of Article 9 should not apply to
him. Furthering the third party's argument is the fact that Article 9 includes a
specific provision regarding the priority of security interests in fixtures.' 79 A
detailed analysis is included in the statute provision that delineates the situations
in which a perfected security interest in a fixture will have priority over a
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of real estate. 80 In interpreting
statutes, many scholars adhere to the whole act rule that suggests that the
interpretation of one section of the statute only can be successfully accomplished
by examining the entire statute.'" The Supreme Court also has held that when
interpreting a statute, the court should not simply examine a particular clause,

176. Id.at 761-62. For instance, the court referred to the scope and purpose section
of Article 9, the definitions section and a section which permits the acquisition of a
separate security interest in crops. Id.
177. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-203 (Supp. 1997).
178. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text for a description of the relevant
UCC provisions.
179. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-313 (1994). The statute section is entitled "Priority
of security interests in fixtures". Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-313 (1994). The statute
provides:
A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting
interest of an encumbrancer or owner of real estate where the security interest
is a purchase money security interest, the interest of the encumbrancer or
owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is
perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten
days thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is
in possession of the real estate; or the security interest is perfected by a fixture
filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the
security interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in
title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor has an interest of record in
the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or the fixtures are readily
removable factory or office machines or readily movable replacements of
domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and before the goods become
fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method permitted by this
article; or the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal
or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any
method permitted by this article.
180. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-313 (1994).
181. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, § 1 (2d ed. 1995).
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but instead, the court should examine the entire statute as a whole. 2 Applying
this rule, it could be argued that the legislature did not intend for third parties to
be covered by Article 9 when determining priority to crops; otherwise it would
have included provisions similar to those found in the sections referring to
fixtures.
Another valid argument, which was attempted by the defendant in
Newcomb,' is based on the exclusions provided in Section 400.9-104."'
Section 400.9-104 provides a list of circumstances in which Article 9 should not
be applied. 85 One of the enumerated exclusions states that Article 9 does not
86
apply to the creation or transfer of an interest in, or lien on, real estate.'
However, the court in Newcomb determined that because growing crops are
considered personal property, not real estate, the Article 9 exclusion provision
did not apply."8 7
While this appears to be sound logic, other courts have differed from the
Newcomb court and have applied the various exclusions within the exclusion
provision to similar situations. Although no court has directly used the real
estate exclusion, it follows that courts could use the same type of analysis in
future decisions. These courts hold that Article 9 does not cover the particular
matter because of the exclusion section and, instead, apply the state common
law. 8 For example, an Illinois appellate court determined that a landlord's
statutory crop lien for rent had priority over the bank's security interest in
proceeds from the sale of crops.'89 The court examined the provision of Article
9 that specifically excludes landlord's liens and determined that the drafters of
Article 9 could not have included more specific language. 9 ' Due to the
unambiguous language of the statute, the court held that the adoption of Article
9 had no effect on the superiority of the landlord's crop lien.' 9' In reaching this
decision, the court emphatically denied applying the scope and purpose

182. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
183. United States v. Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758, 761 (8th. Cir. 1982).
184. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-104 (Supp. 1997) provides a list of topics which
should be excluded from application of Article 9. Included in that list is "the creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder ....
MO. REv. STAT. § 400.9-104 (Supp. 1997).
185. Mo. REV. STAT. § 400.9-104 (Supp. 1997).
186. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-104 (Supp. 1997).
187. Newcomb, 682 F.2d at 761.
188. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317
(E.D. Mo. 1973); Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 454 N.E.2d 357 (II1. App. Ct. 1983);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 268 A.2d 330 (N.J. Super. Ct.

Law Div. 1970).
189. Dwyer, 454 N.E.2d at 357.
190. Id. at 359.
191. Id. at 360.
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provision to extend the application of Article 9.1 This decision suggests that
some courts will be unwilling to apply Article 9 when the situation expressly
involves a matter which is deemed to be excluded under the statute. While it
does not appear that a court has refused to apply the UCC due to the real estate
lien exclusion, these decisions could provide a pathway for a court to uphold the
real estate exclusion and apply the common law of the state. If Missouri chose
to follow this approach, the common law would mandate that the crops return to
the individual entitled to possession of the land. 93 By following the common
law of Missouri instead of the UCC, two very different results would occur.
Due to this discrepancy in outcomes, it appears that a rule needs to be
established in order to allow creditors and secured interest holders adequate
notice on the procedures they need to implement in order to have a priority
interest in crops. If Missouri determines that the UCC should apply regardless
of the real estate lien exclusion, more precise priority rules need to be enacted
within Article 9 regarding crop distribution. Obviously, the legislature is capable
of drafting such explicit rules because it has chosen to do so in the fixtures
provisions of Article 9.94 In addition, other states, such as Illinois, have
modified certain statutes dealing with real estate mortgages to make it clear that
Article 9 governs claims to crops. 95 The Illinois statute provides that with
regard to any crops growing or grown on mortgaged real estate, the rights of a
mortgagee in possession shall be subject to a security interest properly perfected
under Article 9 of the UCC.'9 A similar statute enacted in Missouri would allow
all interest holders notice of any priority interest in the crops, thereby eliminating
any uncertainty over the present state of the law.
If, however, Missouri refuses to apply the UCC and instead follows the
common law approach in all situations, a more pro-farmer approach should be
considered. Due to the vast number of Missouri farmers and the economic
situation many farmers now face, a pro-farmer statute could seriously lift some
of the burden that the current law presently applies. If the legislature is

192. Id. The court stated that "[t]here is no need for this court or any court to
search for hidden purposes in the provision of Article 9 in order to determine its scope.
The language of 9-104(b) and 9-102(2) is crystal clear-no part of Article 9, including
the priority rules, apply to a landlord's statutory lien." Id. The scope and purpose
section was one of the three sections alluded to as support for the Newcomb decision.
This court would clearly disagree with the use of that section to support a determination
to apply Article 9.
193. Fletcher v. Stillman, 934 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). While the
court does not specifically address this issue, the court adheres to the rule that the
individual who has possession of the land should also have possession of the crops. Id.

In applying this rule to the instant situation, the original land owner would have
possession of the land; therefore, the land owner would also be entitled to the crops.

194. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.9-313 (1994).
195. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1702 (West 1992).
196. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1702 (West 1992).
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unwilling to freely distribute the crops to the famer who loses his land through
foreclosure sale, a compromise could be reached by enacting a statute similar to
that of Mississippi.'97 A similar statute would allow the mortgagor the
opportunity to re-enter his land and harvest or cultivate his crops, so long as he
first paid a reasonable compensation for use of the land.'9 8 While this type of
statute greatly benefits the mortgagor, it also attempts to appease the purchaser
by entitling him to some money for use of his newly purchased land. By
implementing such a statute, the farmer may be able to alleviate some of his
present economic troubles by at least recovering some of his past investments
and profits from the cultivation and harvest of his crops.
Regardless of whether Missouri chooses to follow the UCC approach or the
common law approach to the distribution of crops, it appears that the law needs
to be clearer in order to allow all parties an opportunity to protect themselves
from other interests. The conflict between individuals with real estate interests
and security interest holders over the distribution of crops can be trouble'some
and will likely continue until a specific rule is enunciated.' 99 Due to the
uncertainty that currently prevails, attorneys representing a vendor (farmer)
should draft a provision in the contract that specifically reserves his right to the
crops."' In addition, if the contract contains a reservation for mature crops,
attorneys should include the reservation in the deed of conveyance of the land.2"'
These simple safeguards could enable a farmer to retain his crops after a
foreclosure sale.
VI. CONCLUSION

The decision reached in Fletcherv. Stillman-thatthere must be an actual
severance of the crops in order for the debtor to retain possession of them after
a foreclosure sale-adheres to prior case law in Missouri and the majority of
common law jurisdictions. However, these decisions holding the crops to be
part of the realty inherently fail to give sufficient weight to the notion of fairness
and equity and leave the debt-ridden farmer in dire straits. Equally troublesome
is the notion that different results could be reached depending on the courts'

197. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-25-25 (1972).
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-25-25 (1972).

199. Lander, supra note 25, at 430.
200. See Holliday, supra note 25, at 1267.
201. See Holliday, supra note 25, at 1267.
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desire to apply the UCC instead of the state common law. The UCC contradicts
the view that crops are part of the realty and, instead, deems crops personal
property. Because of the conflicting results reached by the UCC and the
common law, a universal rule needs to be implemented throughout the state. In
order to revitalize the plagued agricultural economy, this universal rule should
be constructed in a pro-farmer light.
JENNIFER J. SMITH
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